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Do Two Wrongs Protect a 
Prosecutor?
BY PeteR A. JOY AND 
KeViN c. McMUNiGAL
May a former criminal defendant bring a civil rights action against a prosecu-tor who fabricated evidence during an 
investigation and then introduced that evidence 
against the defendant at trial? The Seventh and 
Second Circuits have divided in answering this 
question. On November 4, 2009, the Supreme 
Court heard oral argument in an Eighth Circuit 
case raising this question, Pottawattamie County 
v. Harrington, 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. 
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (April 20, 2009), and 
many expected the Court to resolve the circuit 
split later this term. But on January 4, 2010, the 
Court dismissed the case and the lawyers an-
nounced a $12 million settlement. Lower federal 
courts outside the Second and Seventh Circuits 
will thus continue to have to choose between two 
strikingly different approaches to the prosecuto-
rial immunity question that was central to the 
Pottawattamie case.
case Background
A jury convicted the plaintiffs in Pottawattamie 
County of the murder of a security guard at an 
Iowa car dealership, based largely on the testi-
mony of a 16-year-old cooperating witness with 
a long criminal record. The trial judge sentenced 
the defendants to life imprisonment. In 2003, the 
Iowa Supreme Court overturned the convictions 
due to the prosecution’s failure to disclose excul-
patory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963). The state’s primary witness 
recanted, saying he lied to gain reward money 
and avoid being charged himself  with the security 
guard’s murder.
Both the trial and appellate court opinions de-
scribe in detail serious allegations concerning the 
key witness’s testimony. In regard to bias, he had 
several incentives to lie: a $5,000 reward, avoid-
ing being charged with murder, and receiving help 
from the prosecutor with other charges pending 
against him. He implicated the plaintiffs only af-
ter prompting by the defendant prosecutors. The 
witness also made many inconsistent statements, 
changing his “story” multiple times and implicat-
ing other people before implicating the plaintiffs. 
In regard to veracity, several of the statements 
he made prior to implicating the plaintiffs were 
known to be demonstrably false. In addition, he 
lacked knowledge of important details of the 
crime. For example, he first stated the guard had 
been killed with a pistol, then with a 20-gauge 
shotgun, and finally, after being told a 12-gauge 
shell had been found at the crime scene, with a 
12-gauge shotgun. The plaintiffs alleged that, 
aware of these weaknesses, the defendants co-
erced this malleable witness into implicating the 
plaintiffs, both African American and neither lo-
cal residents, and exonerating the initial primary 
suspect, a local white man. The defendant pros-
ecutors then introduced the testimony at trial, re-
sulting in conviction.
ethics Provisions
Regardless of whether immunity shields a pros-
ecutor from a civil rights suit, the misconduct al-
leged in such cases, if  proven, typically violates a 
number of ethics rules. Fabricating evidence and 
counseling or assisting a witness to testify falsely 
violates Model Rule 3.4(b). Offering fabricated 
testimony knowing it to be false violates Model 
Rule 3.3(a)(3). Pursuing a case based on fabricat-
ed evidence violates Model Rule 3.8(a), and fail-
ure to reveal exculpatory evidence violates Model 
Rule 3.8(d). 
In addition to these specific ethics rules, it is a 
violation of Model Rule 8.4(a) to violate an ethics 
rule by knowingly assisting or inducing another 
to do so, or to do so through the acts of anoth-
er. Thus, a prosecutor who advises the police to 
falsify evidence is ethically culpable. Rule 8.4(d) 
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct prej-
udicial to the administration of justice. Falsify-
ing evidence or using false evidence could easily 
qualify as conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice.
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Prosecutorial immunity
A key issue in the Pottawattamie County case is 
whether the defendants are entitled to absolute im-
munity or qualified immunity in relation to the al-
leged fabrication misconduct. Absolute immunity, 
as the phrase suggests, insulates the prosecutor 
from civil liability even if the prosecutor engaged 
in the alleged misconduct. If absolute immunity 
applies, a case against a prosecutor is terminated 
at a very early point, often through summary judg-
ment. Under qualified immunity, by contrast, the 
prosecutor has immunity only for discretionary ac-
tions that do not “violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.” (Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).) If qualified immunity is 
applicable, a case is likely to proceed to discovery 
and possibly to trial to determine the factual issues 
presented by that defense.
The seminal Supreme Court case dealing with 
prosecutor immunity is Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409 (1976). In Imbler and its progeny, the 
most recent of which is Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 
129 S. Ct. 855 (2009), the Supreme Court has held 
that whether a prosecutor has absolute immunity 
or qualified immunity depends both on the type 
of task the prosecutor is performing and when 
that task occurs. If  the task entails advocacy, ab-
solute immunity is granted. For example, in its re-
cent Van de Kamp opinion, the Court stated that 
absolute immunity attaches “when a prosecutor 
prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding” or “ap-
pears in court to present evidence in support of a 
search warrant application.” (Id. at 861.) 
If  the prosecutor’s task when the alleged mis-
conduct occurred involves investigation or ad-
ministration, then qualified immunity applies. As 
examples of conduct to which qualified immu-
nity applies, the Van de Kamp Court pointed to 
a prosecutor making statements to the press or 
acting “as a complaining witness in support of a 
warrant application.” (Id.)
Timing helps distinguish advocacy from inves-
tigation and administration and thus is a factor 
in marking the line between absolute and quali-
fied immunity. The Court has indicated that ad-
vocacy cannot occur prior to the establishment of 
probable cause to arrest. “A prosecutor neither is, 
nor should consider himself  to be, an advocate 
before he has probable cause to have anyone ar-
rested.” (Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 
274 (1993).)
Policy concerns
A major theme in the Imbler line of cases is the ar-
ray of pragmatic policy concerns raised by immu-
nity for prosecutors. The possibility of being held 
personally liable would create a conflict of inter-
est for prosecutors, tempting them not to pros-
ecute valid cases out of fear of being subjected to 
a later lawsuit. Without immunity, limited public 
resources in the form of prosecutor time and en-
ergy would be diverted from pursuing criminals 
to defending themselves in lawsuits. Another con-
cern is that without immunity, the number of in-
valid cases raising spurious claims of wrongdoing 
might overwhelm prosecutorial resources.
In response, those hostile to prosecutorial im-
munity point out that absolute immunity leaves 
those genuinely wronged by prosecutor miscon-
duct without compensation for often substantial 
injuries. Prosecutorial immunity also undermines 
specific and general deterrence of prosecutorial 
wrongdoing, the frequency and severity of which 
have been illustrated by many highly publicized 
wrongful convictions in recent decades. Prosecu-
torial immunity may also discourage supervisory 
prosecutors from monitoring the conduct of line 
prosecutors.
Proponents of prosecutorial immunity counter 
the claim that absolute prosecutorial immunity 
undermines deterrence of prosecutorial wrong-
doing by arguing that the threat of ethical disci-
plinary sanctions fills the deterrence gap. Critics 
of prosecutorial immunity respond by point-
ing to the dramatic under-enforcement of eth-
ics rules against prosecutors across the country. 
The plaintiffs in the Pottawattamie County case, 
for example, pointed out in their Supreme Court 
brief  that, despite the fact that the Iowa Supreme 
Court found that the defendants in the case had 
violated their duty under Brady v. Maryland, 
and thus violated Iowa’s version of Model Rule 
3.8(d), the prosecutors were not even investigated 
for ethical discipline much less disciplined.
investigation or Advocacy?
The distinction between advocacy and investiga-
tion is central to resolution of the central ques-
tion posed in the Pottawattamie County case. On 
which side of this line does the plaintiffs’ fabrica-
tion charge fall? The trial court found that quali-
fied immunity applied to the defendants’ conduct 
prior to the filing of charges, but that absolute im-
munity applied to the allegations that they failed 
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to disclose exculpatory evidence and coerced ad-
ditional “jailhouse informant” witnesses after 
the filing of charges. (McGhee v. Pottawattamie 
County, 475 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2007).) 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed both of these con-
clusions. (McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 
F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008).)
The Eighth Circuit’s affirmance is consistent 
with the Second Circuit opinion of Judge Jon O. 
Newman in Zahrey v. Coffee, 221 F.3d 342 (2d 
Cir. 2000), and at odds with the Seventh Circuit 
opinion of Judge Frank Easterbrook in Buckley 
v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). De-
spite the fact that the alleged fabrications in Zah-
rey and Buckley took place while the prosecutors 
were acting as investigators, the cases disagree on 
whether such a fabrication constituted a constitu-
tional violation. Judge Easterbrook found that it 
did not, while Judge Newman found that it did.
Judge Easterbrook offered several arguments 
in support of his conclusion in favor of the defen-
dant prosecutors in Buckley. He noted that “the 
exchange of money for information” as well as 
police and prosecutors making “promises to go 
easy” with witnesses in return for cooperation are 
commonplace and do not in and of themselves 
violate the Constitution. He also noted that co-
ercion of a witness violates the witness’s constitu-
tional rights, but not the rights of another person 
whom the coerced witness implicates. The impli-
cated person’s rights are violated only if  and when 
such coerced testimony is used against the defen-
dant in a judicial proceeding. Such use by a pros-
ecutor at trial constitutes advocacy and qualifies 
for absolute immunity. When the same prosecutor 
creates fabricated evidence during an investiga-
tion and then uses it at trial, Judge Easterbrook 
placed the “location” of the constitutional viola-
tion in the advocacy phase of the case and thus 
subject to absolute immunity. 
In support of this “location” assessment, Judge 
Easterbrook offered a causation analysis. If  a 
prosecutor fabricates evidence in the investigative 
phase and then introduces that evidence at trial, 
Judge Easterbrook saw the subsequent wrong-
ful use at trial as a superseding act breaking the 
chain of causation between the investigative fab-
rication and the plaintiff ’s ultimate loss of liberty. 
Easterbrook found that this break in the causal 
chain effectively insulates the prosecutor from li-
ability for the original fabrication while absolute 
immunity shields the prosecutor from liability for 
using the fabricated evidence at trial. In essence, 
in Judge Easterbrook’s view, a second wrong of 
using fabricated evidence at trial protects a pros-
ecutor from liability for a prior wrong of fabricat-
ing the evidence.
Judge Newman, writing for a unanimous Sec-
ond Circuit panel, disagreed both with Judge 
Easterbrook’s reasoning and the result to which it 
leads, as had Judge Fairchild of the Seventh Cir-
cuit in dissenting from Judge Easterbrook’s opin-
ion in Buckley. Both Judge Newman and Judge 
Fairchild concluded that a defendant does state a 
constitutional claim if  he or she can show that the 
prosecutor’s investigatory fabrication caused the 
defendant to be charged and tried.
Judge Newman found that “the manufacture 
of false evidence” by any governmental official 
is a due process violation. Citing the language of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, he agreed 
with Judge Easterbrook that such a due process 
violation is not actionable unless it causes a de-
privation of liberty.
Unlike Judge Easterbrook, though, Judge 
Newman did not find that the prosecutor’s use 
of  the fabricated evidence at trial broke the 
causal chain from the earlier fabrication and 
insulated the prosecutor from liability for that 
fabrication. In deciding that a prosecutor’s use 
of  fabricated evidence does not break the chain 
of  causation in this situation, Judge Newman 
emphasized that such subsequent use was not a 
truly independent act and that it was foreseeable 
by the prosecutor at the time the evidence was 
fabricated. He relied heavily on cases from the 
Fifth and Second Circuits, each of  which had re-
jected the sort of  causation reasoning adopted 
by Judge Easterbrook. 
Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1984), 
involved a mayor who was also an ex officio magis-
trate and municipal court judge. Acting as mayor, 
the defendant investigated and in bad faith signed 
a complaint against the plaintiff. The mayor then 
issued an arrest warrant pursuant to which the 
plaintiff  was arrested. The mayor acted in a ju-
dicial capacity and was thus entitled to absolute 
immunity for issuance of the arrest warrant. But 
the Fifth Circuit concluded that he could none-
theless be held liable for his earlier nonjudicial in-
vestigative acts and swearing out of the criminal 
complaint, neither of which were within absolute 
immunity. The Thomas court specifically rejected 
the defendant’s argument that his immunized ju-
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dicial act of issuing the arrest warrant broke the 
causal chain between his bad faith swearing out 
of the criminal complaint and the plaintiff ’s ar-
rest. Because both acts were done by the same 
person, there was no “independent decision” of 
the sort that may break a causal chain. In short, 
the court found that the defendant “may not in-
oculate” his earlier wrongful conduct by a “pen 
stroke” in issuing the arrest warrant.
White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988), 
presented the same causation question of whether 
the causal chain between a government official’s 
wrongful conduct and a plaintiff ’s loss of liberty 
is severed by a later wrongful act by the same of-
ficial. In White, a police officer provided false tes-
timony as a complaining witness, then repeated 
that false testimony as an ordinary witness. He 
had absolute immunity as an ordinary witness, 
but not as a complaining witness. The Second 
Circuit in White rejected the argument that the 
officer’s immunized testimony broke the causal 
chain stemming from his earlier wrongful con-
duct. The court refused to allow the defendant in 
White effectively “to transpose the immunity” of 
an ordinary witness onto his prior acts as a com-
plaining witness.
In rejecting the Easterbrook causation analy-
sis, Judge Newman in Zahrey noted that a govern-
ment official who fabricated evidence—whether a 
police officer or a prosecutor—would not escape 
liability if  he or she then provided that fabricated 
evidence to an unsuspecting prosecutor who in 
good faith used it to wrongfully convict someone. 
Under the Easterbrook analysis, a prosecutor act-
ing in bad faith as an advocate who uses fabri-
cated evidence the prosecutor previously created 
could insulate himself  or herself  from liability for 
the investigative misconduct while the police offi-
cer or prosecutor who handed fabricated evidence 
to an unsuspecting prosecutor would remain li-
able. Judge Newman reasoned that “[i]t would be 
a perverse doctrine of tort and constitutional law 
that would hold liable the fabricator of evidence 
who hands it to an unsuspecting prosecutor but 
exonerate the wrongdoer who enlists himself  in a 
scheme to deprive a person of liberty.” (Zahrey v. 
Coffee, 221 F.3d at 353.)
Our View
We hope federal courts that confront this issue in 
the future recognize the analysis and reasoning of 
Judge Newman in Zahrey and Judge Fairchild’s 
dissent in Buckley, as well as the analogous rea-
soning and analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Thom-
as and the Second Circuit in White, as both more 
persuasive and more pragmatic than that used by 
Judge Easterbrook in Buckley.
The prosecutor who intentionally fabricates 
evidence in the investigative stage is clearly blame-
worthy and dangerous. If  that prosecutor then 
knowingly uses that fabricated evidence to indict 
and convict a defendant, the prosecutor commits 
additional blameworthy and dangerous acts. Pros-
ecutors argue every day at sentencings throughout 
the country that repeated criminal acts are more 
deserving of punishment and show greater need 
for deterrence than isolated crimes. Similarly, the 
use of fabricated evidence in cases such as Pot-
tawattamie County aggravates the prosecutor’s 
blameworthiness and danger, increasing both the 
retributive and deterrent justifications for impos-
ing monetary liability. Under Judge Easterbrook’s 
approach, though, the blameworthy and danger-
ous acts of using fabricated evidence to indict and 
again to convict has the odd effect of insulating 
the prosecutor from civil liability for the earlier 
wrongful conduct of fabricating evidence. If  two 
wrongs don’t make a right, neither should they 
protect a prosecutor from answering for wrong-
doing. n
The prosecutor who intentionally fabricates  
evidence in the investigative stage is blameworthy.  
If he or she then uses that evidence to convict,  
that prosecutor is dangerous. 
